1. Proliferation of Turkish-made military UAVs
In recent years, military drones made in Turkey, especially UAVs (Unmanned Aerial Vehicles), have attracted the attention of military personnel and the media.
For nearly 20 years since the late 1990s, the Turkish government has been striving to develop a domestic industrial base for the development and production of domestically produced UAVs. The results came to fruition with the appearance of the main aircraft in the late 2010s, and since 2016, in the process of intervention in the Syrian civil war, in 2020, it has played an active role in controlling the war situation in export destinations Libya and Azerbaijan.
So far, there have been articles reporting on the success of Turkish-made UAVs in each battle, but there are articles about the future of Turkish-made military UAVs, including the construction of national strategies and industrial infrastructure related to domestic UAV development. Comprehensive examination is not seen.
Looking at the UAV development process and government documents so far, we can see that Turkey has continued consistent development efforts under a certain national strategy, with government, military, and private companies working together. Analyzing the background of the success of Turkish-made UAVs reveals that Turkey could not be established as a UAV powerhouse overnight, and that future development trends are unstable.
2. Domestic UAV Development History
It is said that interest in drones increased within the Turkish government around the end of the Cold War. From the mid-1990s to the 2000s, efforts were made to develop domestic products, but the GNAT750S (1995) made by General Atomic in the United States and the Heron (2005) made by IAI in Israel were heavily dependent on imports. It was a system that
This import-dominated system later shifted to a domestic-dominated one, and it is pointed out that the reason for this is the impact of the arms embargo by Western countries. Since the Cyprus conflict that broke out in 1973-74, the U.S. embargo on Turkey has continued, and later, due to differences in opinion on the Iran nuclear agreement and the impact of human rights diplomacy, the import of the latest weapons such as the RQ-9 Reaper. became increasingly difficult. On the other hand, the relationship with Israel, another major source of imports, has always been a problem of balance with relations with Arab countries. When the Israeli army attempted to inspect a fleet established for the purpose of humanitarian assistance to the United States, it developed into a battle with the fleet that resisted, and nine members of the fleet died during the battle). As a result, diplomatic relations deteriorated rapidly, and it became difficult to import from here as well.
Other factors that urged the shift from an import-based system include the fact that the initially imported aircraft could not meet the required performance because it was technically immature, and the dependence on foreign military technology. Concerns have also been raised.
As a result of the accumulation of these factors, in the late 2000s and early 2010s, Turkey will focus on the domestic production of military drones in earnest. Already in 2005 Bayraktar-Mini by Baykar-Makina and in 2010 prototypes of Anka by Turkish Aviation Industries (TAI) were developed, but the former was extremely limited in terms of performance, and the latter crashed in 15 minutes during a test flight.
However, while repeating these failures, the military industry continued to improve the performance of drones, and finally in 2014, Baikal Machina launched Bayraktar TB2, which is the main aircraft, and later in 2016, TAI completed development of the Anka S.
Even after the development of the flagship aircraft that satisfies the requirements of the military, improvements in the cruising range and attack capabilities of UAVs, USVs (Unmanned Surface Vehicles), UUVs (Unmanned Underwater Vehicles), and UGVs (Unmanned Ground Vehicle) and other technological developments by the domestic munitions industry continue to develop to this day. Figure 1 summarizes the development status of not only UAVs but also UUVs, USVs, and UGVs in general, in chronological order. Figure 2 summarizes the specifications of major domestic military UAVs, including those currently under development.
[Figure 1] Main development timeline until the end of 2020 [Note 1]
[Figure 2] List of major UAVs developed in Turkey [Note 2]
3. National Strategy for Domestic Production
Turkey has been guiding and supervising the civilian military industry after clarifying the development direction and intended use of military UAVs. . Turkey's direction is clarified in the "Türkiye İnsansız Hava Aracı Sistemleri Yol Haritası 2011-2030" ("UAV System Roadmap 2011-2030 ”, hereinafter referred to as “Roadmap”).
First of all, the government recognizes that the military use of UAVs will expand worldwide, and that investment in UAV-related technology can bring enormous benefits to Turkey. On top of that, in order to promote domestic production through strategic investment of resources and to form a common understanding among concerned parties, we will deal with a wide range of areas, including military use of UAVs, civilian use of UAVs, and international rule-making. there is
Regarding military UAV, as shown in Figure 3, the form of UAV to be developed is defined from the two aspects of the required mission and the system that constitutes the UAV, and the development target year is set. method is adopted.
In addition, as a medium-term (10-year) technology development goal, the development of self-diagnosis and self-repair functions of the system that constitutes the UAV, securing a high degree of autonomy, and improving interoperability with other weapons. , the long-term (15 years) goal is to build self-learning and autonomous decision-making capabilities of AI installed in UAVs, and the final year goal is to develop unmanned combat aircraft.
[Figure 3] Military UAV classification and development goals on the roadmap [Note 3]
Turkey thus had a fairly comprehensive vision when it launched its domestic development in earnest. However, in the nearly ten years since the formulation of the roadmap, as far as I know, there is no evidence that the goals set in the roadmap have been evaluated or reviewed.
In addition to the roadmap, the SSB also formulates the "Strategic Planı" ("Strategic Plan") once every five years, and UAV development is one of its goals. After formulating the roadmap, three versions, 2012, 2017, and 2019, were published, but as shown in Figure 4, the content is abstract and does not help evaluation.
[Figure 4] UAV development goals described in the Strategic Plan [Notes 4, 5, 6]
In this way, it is difficult to accurately evaluate the achievement status of goals directly from government documents, but the following evaluations are possible from the current development trends.
First of all, regarding fixed-wing aircraft, based on the performance of the developed Anchor-S and Bayraktar TB2, the development up to system 5 in Figure 3 has been completed, and system 6 is currently on the verge of deployment. It is presumed that the situation is coming. Among the aircraft under development, TAI's Axungle seems to be an aircraft that falls under System 6, but the target year of 2018 has been exceeded, indicating that development has not progressed as planned.
Also, regarding rotorcraft, small UAVs such as Kaag and Selche have been reported to be active, but the development trends of UAVs that correspond to systems 11 and 12 have not been made public, and the current situation is unknown. is.
It is speculated that the criteria for altitude, speed, and cruising distance used for definitions in the roadmap are unknown, but overall development is progressing, but there is a delay compared to the originally set goals. can be heard.
4. Popularization of military drones and their use on the battlefield
Although questions remain regarding the consistency with the plan and progress, there is no doubt that Turkey has succeeded in developing domestically produced military UAVs. Since 2016, it has been used extensively in operations in northern Syria to intervene in the Syrian civil war.
In Operation Euphrates Shield (OES) in 2016, the number of UAVs deployed was small, and as a result of deploying operations with mainly ground forces, the battlefield became bogged down as it shifted to urban warfare, resulting in heavy casualties. received. Based on this experience, Operation Olive Branch (OOB) in 2018 and Operation Peace Spring (OPS) in 2019 will deploy UAVs proactively to eliminate obstacles to ground forces. We have established an operating policy.
Operation Spring Shield (OSS), which began at the end of February 2020, demonstrated the best results of this operation method. Immediately after the start of the operation, numerous UAVs attacked the Syrian army, followed by a lightning speed invasion by land forces, which attracted the attention of military personnel around the world. The battle line fell into a stalemate after that, but by completing the operation in a short period of 12 days, they succeeded in minimizing the damage.
The OSS is a rare case in that large numbers of UAVs have operated jointly with other military branches in a large-scale battle between conventional forces, and achieved great results in a short period of time. In the past, there have been cases of UAVs being used in military operations, but the scale, speed, and results of OSS have had a great impact on military personnel in various countries, and some have described this as the birth of a new military doctrine. There were also some who argued that
However, as previously discussed in another article ("Operation Spring Shield-Drone Power Turkey's Planned War-" HP of the Institute for Advanced Technology and Security), the scale of UAVs used in OSS has increased. However, there has been no qualitative change from previous operations in terms of UAV usage and operations. Although different in scale, when compared to other cases of UAVs used in military operations, the missions they engaged in did not differ significantly.
In addition, some argue that one of the arguments for the birth of the new doctrine is the magnitude of the military results obtained by UAVs. It is extremely difficult to get an accurate picture. In the confusion of the battlefield, it is necessary to grasp the number of defeats by UAV alone, and it is also necessary to calculate the battle results for each model.
In this way, there are many unsolved problems even when using UAV's results as a basis. In any case, it is the author's opinion that these reasons alone cannot adequately answer the question of why a new doctrine was born in this operation [Note 7].
5. Exports of Military Drones and Their Impact on International Relations
As was confirmed in the previous section, the activities of Turkish-made UAVs in Syria were widely publicized through the media, but the results of the war were quantitatively and There is ambiguity in the fact that it has not been rigorously proven. Despite its ambiguity, however, the image of an effective weapon has influenced demand for Turkish-made UAVs, gradually increasing their exports.
Figure 5 shows Turkey's UAV exports from 2010 to 2020 in the database of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). Looking at this, it can be seen that the market is expanding mainly in the Middle East and North Africa regions such as Libya, Tunisia and Saudi Arabia, and also in the Caucasus and Black Sea coastal regions such as Ukraine and Azerbaijan. Since the beginning of 2021, countries such as Morocco and the UAE are also reportedly considering importing UAVs from Turkey.
[Figure 5] Turkey's domestic drone export situation (2010-2020) [Note 8]
Figure 6 compares Turkey's UAV exports from 2010 to 2020 with the UAV exporters of the United States, Israel, and China during the same period. Looking at this, it is clear that the number of UAV exports from Turkey is small compared to other major countries, but in terms of export destinations, there is no duplication or competition except for a small number of countries such as the UAE. It can be seen that they are segregated.
[Figure 6] Comparison of UAV exports in the Middle East, North Africa, and the Caucasus region [Note 9]
For now, Turkey does not intend to change its policy of expanding UAV exports, and will try to further expand its market in the Middle East and North Africa region in the future. Not only the United States and China, but also Israel and Iran in the Middle East are actively exporting UAVs, and Turkey's expansion of exports will accelerate competition with these countries. Moreover, expanding UAV exports risks adding new fuel to the fires of regional conflict.
Although it is not in the Middle East, unfortunately, the export of UAVs has ignited conflict and has already had an impact on international relations in the region. That is the second Nagorno-Karabakh conflict that began in September 2020.
In the second Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, the Azerbaijani army, which used imported UAVs made in Israel and Turkey, overturned decades of inferiority against Armenia and achieved great results in the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region. succeeded in recapturing part of the
As shown in Figure 6, the number of UAVs imported by Azerbaijan is overwhelmingly Israeli-made, and Turkish-made aircraft are few in number on the SIPRI database. However, in the face of this conflict, Turkey not only has UAV airframes, but also provides related equipment and skills necessary for military use of UAVs, such as facilities for controlling UAVs from the ground and training for UAV pilots. We export and provide.
It is the same as the case of the previous section in that it is difficult to quantitatively grasp the military results of UAV, but if Turkish-made UAVs played a decisive role in the conflict as reported, The influence of Turkey, which can continue to provide aircraft, related technology, and know-how, will greatly expand.
Already in December 2020, following the outcome of the second Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, Ukraine decided to significantly increase imports of Bayraktar TB2. If we are to provide related technology, operational know-how, tactical ideas, etc. along with expanding the export of drones themselves, there will be a conflict between Turkey, which aims to expand its influence, and importing countries and regional powers that have influence behind them. This will eventually lead to new impacts on international relations in the region [Note 10].
6. Can Turkey Keep Momentum?
So far, we have confirmed that Turkey has built a system for the domestic production of UAVs, and that this has brought about great influence in each aspect of military, economic, and diplomatic aspects. Turkey's UAV development has so far progressed relatively smoothly, albeit with some delays. However, from the progress so far, the existence of anxiety about future UAV development is also visible.
For example, in order to maintain the momentum of development, such as the dependence on overseas technology and the outflow of human resources seeking high wages and favorable environments to Western countries, which became clear due to the Canadian government's embargo on exports after the fall of 2020. Issues to be addressed are gradually becoming clearer.
The development period covered by the "Roadmap" is about to come to an end. Whether or not Turkey can overcome these uncertainties and further develop and accelerate UAV development will likely have a non-negligible impact on trends in international politics in the Middle East and Central Asia.
[Note 1] Created by the author based on various materials
[Note 2] Created by the author based on various materials
[Note 3] SAVUNMA SANAYİİ MÜSTEŞARLIĞI, “Türkiye İnsansız Hava Aracı Sistemleri Yol Haritası 2011-2030,” SAVUNMA SANAYİİ MÜSTEŞARLIĞI, 2011.12 (confirmed on May 22, 2021) http://ercancinar. com/wp-content /uploads/2017/10/SSM_%C4%B0HA_Sistemleri_Yol_Haritas%C4%B1_2012.pdf
[Note 4] SAVUNMA SANAYİİ MÜSTEŞARLIĞI, “Savunma Sanayii Mustesarligi 2012-2016 Strategic Plani,” SAVUNMA SANAYİİ MÜSTEŞARLIĞI, 2011.12 (confirmed on May 22, 2021) https://www.sasad.org.tr/uploaded /Savunma-Sanayii-Mustesarligi-2012-2016-Stratejik-Plani.pdf
[Note 5] SAVUNMA SANAYİİ MÜSTEŞARLIĞI, “Savunma Sanayii Müsteşarlığı 2017-2021 Dönemi Stratejik Plan,” 2017.3 (confirmed on May 22, 2021) https://www.ssb.gov.tr/Images/Uploads/ MyContents/F_20170606155720342529.pdf
[Note 6] T.C. CUMHURBAŞKANLIĞI SAVUNMA SANAYİİ MÜSTEŞARLIĞI, “STRATEJİK PLAN 2019-2023,” T.C. CUMHURBAŞKANLIĞI SAVUNMA SANAYİİ MÜSTEŞARLIĞI, 2019.11 1st May 22) https://www.ssb.gov.tr/ Images/Uploads/MyContents/V_20191204150841743368.pdf
[Note 7] Junpei Makita, "Operation Spring Shield - The state of the war waged by Turkey, a powerhouse of drones -", Institute for Advanced Technology and Security, 2020.11.2 (confirmed on May 22, 2021) https://www.giest.or.jp/contents/reports/mj20201102.htm
[Note 8] Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI Arms Transfers Database (confirmed on May 22, 2021) https://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers
[Note 9] Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
[Note 10] Junpei Makita, "International Relations and Drones Surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh -The Great Game between Turkey and Russia-", Institute for Advanced Technology and Security, 2021.1.28 (confirmed May 22, 2021) ) https://www.giest.or.jp/contents/reports/mj20210128.htm